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International trade and conservation 







We propose a model where the resource planner's management is endogenous because it 
is costly. This allows for the analysis of trade models with renewable resource management 
regimes other than the polar open access and first best regimes. Second best costly management 
regimes are more empirically relevant than the textbook first best policy prescription, which 
motivates our analysis. In a model where static net gains do not depend on the resource stock, 
and where resource management incurs a fixed cost, we answer some policy-relevant questions. 
Indeed, in our second best setting, free trade with "proper" management of resources can lead to 
welfare losses. It can also cause the extinction of a species and as such, hinder the environment. 
In some cases however, we find that trade is welfare increasing and it can be good for the 
environment, promoting natural resource conservation. However, figuring out in which cases it 
can be harmful is helpful for policy-making. This is precisely what is done in this paper. 
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International trade and conservation with costly natural resource management 
by Nancy Bergeron 
1. Introduction 
International trade is necessarily welfare-increasing in the simplest theoretical models, 
but empirical evidence may differ. Questions have also been raised about the potential negative 
impact of international trade on the environment. No clear-cut theoretical result exists however. 
In this paper, we propose a Ricardian trade model, where one production factor of the 
home country is a renewable resource. We analyze whether free trade can be detrimental to the 
environment, by looking at whether it can lead to the extinction of a renewable resource. We find 
that in some cases, free trade causes the extinction of the resource, whereas in others, it is neutral 
or even salutary. As for welfare, it turns out that resource management institutions (or 
management regimes), are very important in our results. 
In 1994, the Marrakhesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, which is 
the WTO's founding charter, was signed following the Uruguay Round. Its preamble refers to the 
importance of sustainable development, including the protection of the environment (WTO, 
2002c). With this Agreement, the WTO was created (formerly "GATT members"), as well as, 
among others, the Committee on Environment and Trade (CET), whose mandate is to study the 
impact of international trade on the environment. In fact, the WTO has been interested in 
environmental policies for a long time. Historically however, the question it asked was whether 
environmental policies hindered free trade. Indeed, the 1971 GATT study entitled "Industrial 
Pollution Control and International Trade" was more concerned about the impact of 
environmental policy on free trade than the potential opposite effect (WTO, 2002b). Now 
however, through the CET, the WTO does ask about free trade potentially hindering the 
environment. As it turns out, our analysis allows us to bring some answers to statements and 
questions recently found on the web site of the WTO, specifically: 
1. "Trade would unambiguously raise welfare if proper environmental policies were in 
place." (WTO, 2002d). 
2. "Does freer trade help or hinder environmental protection?" (WTO, 2002a). 
3. "Members say the removal of trade restrictions and distortions can yield benefits both 
for the multicultural trading system and the environment." (WTO, 2002a).   3
Overall, we are especially interested in the impact of free trade on welfare and resource 
conservation. 
A literature review is presented in the next section. In section 3, we introduce the general 
assumptions underlying all the models in this paper. In sections 4 to 7, the model is analyzed 
under different resource management regimes; potential welfare and conservation impacts of free 
trade are characterized. More specifically, in section 4, we assume an open access management 
regime for the resource sector, which is the worst-case scenario in terms of discounted inter-
temporal welfare maximization. In section 5, we analyze the first best scenario, that is, the 
textbook costless resource management, which is the welfare benchmark. In section 6 we model 
the second best resource management regime due to an instantaneous fixed cost of management. 
In section 7, we explore what we call a "hybrid" management regime based on the second best 
with instantaneous fixed costs, only with a twist. In section 8, we discuss policy implications of 
our results, with a special interest in the World Trade Organization (WTO)'s assertions on trade 
and the environment. We then conclude. 
 
2. Literature Review 
In economics, well-defined property rights are often prescribed as a cure against the over-
exploitation of common-property resources. Property rights theoretically provide incentives to 
work out the socially optimal solution when there are no transactions costs and no strategic 
behavior between agents (Coase, 1960). Demsetz (1967) added that, under nonzero transactions 
costs, property rights are created only if the gain of internalization of externalities becomes 
larger than the cost of internalization. This means that, while property rights may exist on paper, 
their effectiveness does depend on the costs associated with them. The cost of internalization 
may include the administrative costs of policy-making for the government or the cost of 
enforcement of the property rights, since individual agents often have incentives not to follow 
the optimal policy. Therefore, while an unmanaged natural resource will lead to open-access 
exploitation and economic over-harvesting (Gordon, 1954; Scott, 1955; Hardin, 1968), the 
textbook optimal policy is in reality not optimal because it ignores the costs of the policy; the 
world is second best and the optimization process must take that into account. 
Smith (1968) wrote one of the first dynamic models of resource management, although 
his model did not allow for discounting; he maximized steady state utility. Clark's book (1990) is   4
a good source on bioeconomic modeling that summarizes issues of open access exploitation and 
dynamic optimization with discounting. Not surprisingly, it has been shown that open access, 
i.e., economic over-exploitation, of a renewable resource can lead to extinction (Gould, 1972; 
Hoel, 1978; Berck, 1979). However, we also know that dynamic optimization does not preclude 
the optimal extinction of a renewable resource, even when its growth is purely compensatory, 
i.e., concave in stock. This has been shown, namely, by Clark (1973) in a discrete time 
maximization of present value profit from competitive exploitation of a renewable resource 
where the optimal path is a most rapid approach path (MRAP). Clark (1973) shows that if the 
marginal natural growth of the resource close to extinction is small as compared to the discount 
rate, then extinction could result, even though the exploitation regime is not open access. 
Cropper et al. (1979) do a similar analysis, only with a continuous time model, for which the 
optimal path is smooth, but with endogenous price. They get a result similar to Clark (1973), 
specifically, extinction is possible if the discount rate is greater than the marginal natural growth 
rate of the resource close to zero. In Cropper et al. (1979) however, since several steady states 
are possible, whether extinction occurs or not also depends on the initial resource stock. 
The articles mentioned thus far presented models in partial equilibrium. To address 
environmental issues with international trade, recent efforts have concentrated on general 
equilibrium models, some with resource dynamics. Recent papers include Brander and Taylor 
(1997a, 1997b,1998) on renewable resources, Chichilnisky (1993, 1994, 1996) on renewable 
resources and on the environment, Copeland and Taylor (1994) on the environment, Emami and 
Johnston (2000) on renewable resources and Hannesson (2000) on renewable resources as well. 
Most of these papers that dealt with a renewable resource analyzed either the open access 
management regime (infinite discount rate: the future does not matter) or the maximization of 
steady state utility (zero discount rate: the future is as important as the present). However, 
dynamic optimization normally makes use of a discount rate, δ , such that 0 < δ  < ∞, which is 
what will be done in this paper. Also, in recent renewable resource models of trade, specific 
functional forms prevented extinction from occurring with free trade but not in autarky, which 
seems counterintuitive (e.g., Brander and Taylor, 1997a). In the present paper, functional forms 
do not prevent extinction from occurring under free trade. Also, all trade papers mentioned thus 
far assume that the resource management regime is exogenous and constant over trade regimes.   5
These papers provide interesting results, but we wish to go one step further and make the 
resource management regime endogenous. 
One previous paper does just that (Hotte et al., 2000). One difference of our model is that 
it is as general as possible, while Hotte et al. have done numerical simulations. Another 
difference is that our renewable resource is managed by a benevolent resource planner, rather 
than being exploited by agents who maximize their profit and choose to enforce their own 
property rights accordingly. Our resource planner's objective is to maximize the inter-temporal 
economic surplus of the resource sector, taking management cost into account. This is how the 
management regime becomes endogenous in our model; choices over costly management need to 
be made in order to maximize the welfare of the resource sector. 
 
3. General assumptions about the home economy 
In this section, we establish general assumptions about the home economy, which will 
hold true across the different resource management alternatives analyzed in this paper. 
In this paper, we analyze a trade model with two final goods (a resource good, H, and a 
manufactured good, M) and two variable inputs (labor, L, and a resource stock, s). The home 
economy is country A; A as a superscript also stands for equilibrium values in autarky; a 
subscript ∞ will indicate long-run equilibrium as opposed to a transitory path equilibrium. Under 
different resource management regimes, we characterize short run and long run general 
equilibria in autarky and in free trade under small country assumptions, that is, when world 
prices are given to country A. The discount rate, δ, is given and constant; it represents 
individual's inter-temporal preferences. We assume that 0 < δ < ∞, which represents some level 
of impatience for consumption since δ > 0, but also some care for future utility, since δ < ∞. We 
do not allow for saving and borrowing, so the economy's budget must be balanced at each point 
in time. 
3.1. Endowment 
Country A is endowed with total fixed labor equal to L. For simplicity and without loss 
of generality, we normalize total labor to one unit of labor per individual, for a total of L 
individuals in the economy. Furthermore, Country A is endowed with K  units of capital used 
strictly in the manufactures sector.   6
The home economy is endowed with a renewable resource with stock s, which can vary 
over time. We denote the initial resource stock as s0. The resource growth function,  () 0 s g ≥ , is 
assumed to be compensatory:  () ( ) 0 s g 0 g = = , and g''(s) < 0 for all s such that  s s 0 ≤ ≤ , where s 
is the wildlife population's natural carrying capacity and s = 0 implies the irreversible extinction 
of the stock considered. The rate of change of the resource stock, when there is no harvest, is 
written as  () () s g s
dt
t ds
= =  . 
We note that even if a resource stock is unique in the world and the species is dwindling 
on the brink of extinction, then a world price exists that represents the price of a substitute to the 
resource-based good. A famous example is rhinoceros horn powder, which is used in traditional 
Asian medicine, and which can be substituted by, among other medicines, the much cheaper and 
more effective Aspirin for its proven anti-fever effect (Brower, 1994, p.124). Therefore, our 
analysis can be applied to endangered species found only in country A, as long as some 
imperfect substitute exists for them on the world market. Our analysis also applies to other 
renewable resources that exist in the rest of the world as well as in the home economy. Then the 
world relative price represents the ratio for the exact same goods as the ones produced in country 
A. 
3.2. Production 
A P-superscript refers to production, a cursive variable is for individual firms, while 
variables in capital letters are reserved for aggregate quantities. Two goods are produced: a 
resource-based good  () L H H
P , and a manufactured good, which we assume is produced with 
labor and capital. Capital is a fixed factor and can be normalized to 1, so that 





P = γ = γ . The production function  ( ) K , LM
P γ  is characterized by 
constant returns to scale and a diminishing marginal rate of substitution between inputs, leading 
to strict concavity in labor since K  is fixed in the economy:  ( ) 0 L ' M M
P >  and  () 0 L ' ' M M
P < . 
The net gain that arises from the concavity of M
P is the fixed factor rent. 
In this paper, we assume that productivity in the resource good depends only on labor, as 





P Nh N H 0 s ; L H = = > , where  () Ah
P h  is an 
individual firm's output, and N is the number of harvesting firms. We assume that  ()0 h h
P = A  if   7
A A
min
h h 0 ≤ ≤  and that  ()0 h h
P > A  if  A A
min
h h > . This means that there is a minimum labor 




h > > = A A A ; this is the 
production function equivalent of a fixed cost of harvest. For  A A
min
h h > , we assume a concave 
production function, that is,  ()0 ' h h
P > A ,  ( ) 0 ' ' h h
P < A . See Figure 1 for clarification. 
(Insert Figure 1 about here) 
We note that there is no dependence of the harvest production function on the resource 
stock, and that the only input paid for is labor, with wage rate ω. Therefore, in this model, static 
net gains do not depend on the resource stock. This means that the resource stock can only have 
inter-temporal value, depending on the discount rate, when the future is taken into account in an 
objective function. 
The renewable resource stock is affected by harvesting as depicted by the stock transition 
equation:  () ( ) L H s g s H
P − =  . 
3.3. Numéraire good 





H = = , 
where p
H is the resource good price and p
M is the manufactured good price. 
3.4. Consumption 
A C-superscript refers to consumption; a lowercase variable is for individuals, while 
capital letters are reserved for aggregate quantities. We assume that individual preferences can be 
represented by a neoclassical utility function  ( ) m , h u C C , and that this utility function is 
homothetic. A homothetic utility function is a special case of the Gorman form utility function, 
which implies that an individual's utility function is representative of the aggregate
3. We will 
thus be able to infer aggregate consumption easily, as well as aggregate welfare. 
Aggregate income is 
PP Yp H M =+ . Since the utility of preferences is homothetic for all 
individuals in the economy, we can write individual i's consumption of the resource good as h = 
h
C(p)yi and the aggregate consumption as  () () ()
LL CC C C
ii
i1 i1
Hh p y h p y h p Y
==
=== ∑∑ . In the same 
                                                 
3 For details, see Varian (1992), p.152-154.   8
manner, individual i's consumption of the manufactured good is m = m
C(p)yi, and its aggregate 
consumption is  () () ()
LL CC C C
ii
i1 i1
Mm p y m p y m p Y
==
=== ∑∑
4. Homothetic preferences also 
imply that the indirect utility function takes the form  ( ) ( )Y p Y , p v ν = , such that v1 < 0, v11 > 0, 
v2 > 0, v22 = 0 and v12 < 0. This will be helpful in analyzing welfare changes. 
Further, we assume an interior solution to the consumer problem, when possible. This 
means that, at any point in time, if it is impossible to consume both goods (in autarky, because of 
the extinction of the renewable resource, for example), then individuals are worse off than they 
would have been if they could have consumed some of the resource-based good. Therefore, if it 
is possible to consume some of both goods, then that will always be the optimal choice. 
 
4. Open access: complete rent dissipation 
If property rights over the renewable resource are not defined or not effective, then 
exploitation occurs under an open access regime. Profit maximizing harvesters, who hire labor, 
enter the resource sector until their respective profit is equal to zero. The intuition behind this is 
that if one does not exhaust all the rents he can extract at any point in time, then someone else 
will. Thus aggregate and individual harvesting behavior does not take the future into account. 
Time arguments are left out of the notation, except where deemed necessary for comprehension. 
4.1. Production of the resource good 
Each harvesting firm takes the resource price and the wage rate as given, and it hires 
labor to maximize its profit. The objective is: 
( ) [ ] A A
A
h h ph Max
h
ω −        ( 1 )  
Assuming harvesting takes place, the first order condition is 
( ) 0 ' ph h = ω − A .       (2) 
The open access condition, that is the condition of entry of harvesting firms in the 
resource sector until zero profit is obtained, implies 
                                                 
4 Homothetic utility functions can be written as linearly homogeneous in income without loss of generality; see 





h = ω −
A
A       ( 3 )  








h = = A
A
A   =  constant.      (4) 







,        ( 5 )  
a constant ratio. 


















A A . 
Aggregate harvest is then  () ( ) ( ) A A A
~ h
~





P P = = = = . Since h
~
 and  A
~
H are 
constant, it is through N that equilibrium will occur. 
4.2. Production of the manufactured good 
We assume the manufactured good sector has decreasing marginal returns, and that it 
takes the resource price and the wage rate as given. Labor is hired to maximize aggregate profits: 
( ) [ ] L L M Max M M
LM
ω −        ( 6 )  
Assuming an interior solution, the first order condition is 
( ) 0 L ' M M = ω − .        ( 7 )  
Using this first order condition and the results from the resource sector, we obtain that in 
general equilibrium, if both goods are produced, then the marginal value product of labor in both 
sectors is equated to the wage rate: 
( ) h
~
p L ' M M = = ω .        ( 8 )  
4.3. Consumption 
Each individual maximizes his utility under his budget constraint: 
( ) ( ) { } m h p y m , h u Max C C C C
m , h
C C − − λ + .     (9)   10




h = .        ( 1 0 )  
As stated before, aggregate demands are as follows: 
( )
CC Hh p Y =  and  ( )
CC Mm p Y =      (11) 
4.4. Ricardian / Walrasian equilibrium 
Using the conditions on consumption, on production and the resource and labor 
constraints, equilibrium is obtained. At all times t, the endowment and budget constraints of the 
home economy translate into: 







      (12) 
P P M pH Y + =      (13) 
4.5. Autarky: temporary and long-run equilibria 
Again, we assume that as long as the resource is not extinct, then both goods are 
produced and consumed in autarky. The economy's instantaneous Walrasian equilibrium requires 
that production and consumption of the resource good be equal: 
() ( ) ( )
CCP
H h p,Y h p Y ;s 0 Nh L Η= = Η> =  A .   (14) 








.      (15) 
We see that the number of harvesting firms, N, is a function of p, which in general equilibrium 




h = . It is also a function of income, Y, 
which is determined by the parameters of the economy such as individual preferences, harvest 
and manufactures technology, resource stock and quantity of labor. N is also directly a function 





Given that static net gains are not affected by the resource stock, and given that in open 
access, the change of the resource stock is not taken into account in the harvesters' optimization   11
problem, then N is fixed over time. Hence, as long as the resource stock is positive, the aggregate 
harvest and harvest labor also are fixed. 
In autarky, supply and demand of the manufactured good must also be equal: 
() ( ) ( ) ( )
CCPP
M h Mp , Y mp YM MLN . L === −  A      (16) 
Since the harvest is fixed over time, given the total labor constraint, we know that the resource 
good and the manufactures will be produced and consumed in the same proportion until a steady 
state stock is reached. Assuming that the initial resource stock is the natural carrying capacity, s0 
=s, then conservation occurs as long as the equilibrium harvest is no greater than the biological 
growth at the maximum sustainable yield (MSY) stock level: 
given that s0 =s, s
A
∞ > 0 iff  ( ) ( ) ()
P
MSY hh N p,Y,h, g s H ≤   AA . (17) 
If  () () () s g ~ Y , p N H MSY h
P < A , the optimal steady state is stable. In contrast, if 
() () () s g ~ Y , p N H MSY h
P = A , then the optimal steady state is the MSY, and it is unstable. 
If  () () () s g ~ Y , p N H MSY h
P > A , then extinction occurs in finite time. Given that an interior 
solution is optimal in the consumption of both goods, then individuals are worse off than they 
would have been without extinction. 
In the case where the initial resource stock is smaller than the natural carrying capacity, 
then even if condition (17) holds with inequality, we could have extinction. Let us define 




min ≥ = = = = A A , i.e., smin is the lower, 
unstable, steady state stock, out of one or two possible steady states. Then under (17), if s0 < smin, 
extinction will occur. This is illustrated in Figure 2. 
(Insert Figure 2 about here) 
For the following analysis, let us assume that the initial resource stock in autarky is the 
natural carrying capacity, s0 =s, an d t ha t  ( ) ( ) ( ) s g ~ Y , p N H MSY h
P < A , so the resource is at an 
autarkic stable steady state when the country is opened to free trade. 
4.6. Free trade: temporary and long-run equilibria 
We assume that when trade opens, the resource stock is at its stable steady state if there 
are two possible steady states, or that it is at the MSY if it is the only steady state possible:   12
s s sMSY
A < ≤ ∞ . The equilibrium autarky price just before trade opens is noted p
A. Since we 
assume that country A takes world prices as given, we need to analyze two possible cases: 
p p
A W > , and  p p
A W < . The special case where  p p
A W =  would lead to an undetermined initial 








A, when country A opens to free trade, it produces more resource good and may 
or may not specialize in it. In any case, utility is higher initially. The resource good is exported, 
and the manufactured good is imported. If  ( ) s g h
~ ~ N MSY h
T ≤ A , then this equilibrium is 
sustainable in the long run; in such a case, utility is higher than in autarky forever. Otherwise, 
extinction occurs, and country A exports some M in order to import some H. Utility is lower 
thereafter, although utility discounted to the time when trade opens could be higher or lower than 
it would have been in autarky. This is due to the lack of effective property rights over the 
resource: gains from trade are mitigated by the dynamic inefficiency, and they can even be 
entirely dissipated. 
Proof – specialization vs. diversification 
See APPENDIX I.   
5 
 
Case 1 of the open access model with trade is illustrated in Figure 3. 






Country A produces more manufactures than in autarky, and it may or may not specialize 
in it. In either the diversified case or the specialized case, the long run equilibrium stock with 
free trade, s
T
∞ , is such that  () ( ) s g L L H M
P
∞ = −  and s
T
∞  > s
A
∞ . Therefore extinction cannot occur 
                                                 
5 All proofs are in APPENDIX I.   13
in this case due to trade. Also, manufactures are exported and the resource good is imported. 
Furthermore, utility is higher forever, and the resource good does not go extinct.   
This is because there are gains from trade, and the dynamic externality due to the open 
access exploitation regime is lessened in this case under diversification or altogether eliminated 
if there is specialization in the manufactures. Overall, welfare is unambiguously improved, both 
inter-temporally and in steady state. 
These welfare results are somewhat similar to those found in Brander and Taylor (1997a). 
Indeed, when harvest decreases after country A opens to trade, then steady state welfare 
decreases as compared to autarky, and even discounted welfare could decrease as compared to 
what it would have been in autarky. However, Brander and Taylor's specific functional forms 
made it so that extinction could occur in autarky but not in free trade, which seems 
counterintuitive when thinking of extinction problems. Here instead, when p
W > p
A, we may 
have extinction under free trade. Our example here is somewhat specific because static net gains, 
i.e.,  () [] A A
A
h h ph Max
h
ω − , are not affected at all by the resource stock. Indeed, we assumed that 




A, country A will produce more manufactures than in autarky, and it may or may 
not specialize in it. In either the diversified case or the specialized case, the long run equilibrium 
stock with free trade, s
T
∞ , is such that  ( ) ( ) s g L L H M
P
∞ = −  and s
T
∞  > s
A
∞ . Therefore extinction 
cannot occur in this case due to trade. Also, manufactures are exported and the resource good is 
imported. Furthermore, utility is higher forever, and the resource good does not go extinct. 
This is because there are gains from trade, and the dynamic externality due to the open 
access exploitation regime is lessened in this case under diversification or altogether eliminated 
if there is specialization in the manufactures. Overall, welfare is unambiguously improved, both 
inter-temporally and in steady state. 
Case 2 of the open access model with trade is illustrated in Figure 4. 
(Insert Figure 4 about here) 
   14
5. First Best World: Costless Management, or Utopia 
The model presented here is the optimal benchmark. Distortions to the economy due to 
lack of property rights are corrected at no cost through a unit-tax, τ, imposed on the harvesters. 
In this first best model, individuals and firms behave optimally, even though they have unilateral 
incentives not to (they could cheat and not pay the tax for example); this is Utopia. 
5.1. Production of the resource good 
In this model, we must figure out the behavior of harvesting firms first. Their behavior 
will then be taken into account in the problem of a benevolent social planner, who must decide 
on the appropriate per-unit tax, τ. 
5.1.1. Harvesting firms 
The resource price, the wage rate and the tax rate are exogenously given to each 
harvesting firm. Since firms do not own the resource, they are open access harvesters, and as 
such, they will hire labor to maximize profits, and there will be entry of harvesting firms until 
profits are equal to zero. The harvesters' objective now includes the per-unit tax: 
( ) ( ) [ ] A A A
A
h h h h ph Max
h
τ − ω −       (18) 
The harvesters' first order condition and the open access zero-profit condition lead to the 
same result as before: each firm will harvest at its maximum average productivity of labor, at 
level h
~
, as defined by equation (4). Therefore, we obtain the usual result that with a per-unit tax, 
the quantity of inputs used per firm does not change; instead, it is the total number of firms that 
is affected by the tax. 
Hence, from the first order condition to problem (18) and equation (4), when the resource 







.        ( 1 9 )  



















A A . Aggregate harvest is still written as  ( )
P





h  are constant, it is again through N that equilibrium will occur. Here however, if the unit-tax, 
τ, changes through time, N will also change.   15
5.1.2. The resource planner 
In this Utopian world, we suppose that there exists a resource planner who has the power 
to charge a per-unit tax to the harvesters, and who wants to maximize the inter-temporal welfare 
(i.e., total economic surplus) of the resource sector. The tax is to be spent in the economy in a 
non-distortionary manner. 
We note that, since the solution to (18) is given by equation (4), then the behavior of 
harvesting firms is  () A A ~ h
~
* h h h = . Hence, we can write aggregate production as 
P
h HN h =  A in the 
resource planner's problem. This way, the planner charges a tax, τ(t), in order to induce the 
optimal number of firms, N(t), in the industry. In autarky, the resource planner's problem is 
therefore 



















ω − ∫ A
A




() () , t , 0 t N , t s
given is s 0 t s
~ h
~





− = A 
 
where x is a placeholder. 
The current value Hamiltonian corresponding to the resource planner's autarkic problem 
is: 
() () () A A
A ~ h
~








− µ + ω − ∫ =      (21) 
where µ is the corresponding current value co-state variable or shadow value of the resource. 
Using Leibnitz' rule of differentiation of integrals where appropriate and assuming an interior 
solution, the necessary conditions for this problem are as follow. 







h N = µ − ω − = A       ( 2 2 )  
() s ' g H
~
s µ − = µδ − µ = −          ( 2 3 )  
() A  ~ h
~
N s g s H
~
h − = = µ        ( 2 4 )  
() 0 e t lim
t
t
≥ µ δ −
∞ →
,  () () 0 t s e t lim
t
t
= µ δ −
∞ →
.        ( 2 5 )    16






NN < ⋅ = A . 
Second order conditions are also satisfied to guarantee a unique solution to this problem. Indeed, 
() 0 s ' ' g H
~
ss < µ = ,  0 H
~






s ss h h h > − A A A , which means we have a strictly 
concave problem. 
We see, by comparing the harvesters' first order condition of problem (18) to equation 







 from equation (19), when the resource good is produced in autarky. Also, if  0 > µ  for 
the entire range of possible resource stock, according to (23),the unique optimal steady state 
occurs where g'(s) = δ. Therefore, optimally, if g'(0) > δ, then we have conservation in the long 
run, while if g'(0) ≤ δ, then extinction is optimal. To summarize, we write the steady state stock 
as  () {} [] δ ≤ = ∞ s ' g : s inf s , which includes both potential outcomes. 
In order to better understand the dynamics of the resource planner's model, we first 






− = µ A . From this, we substitute µ into (23): 










− = µ A  .      (26) 
We find µ   by differentiating (22) with respect to time: 
A   ~ h
~
' p N h = µ          (27) 





























h      (28) 
 
Proposition 3 
In autarky, the resource planner's optimal path is monotonic in s and in H
P. As s increases 
(or decreases) towards its steady state, then the harvest increases (decreases) through the increase 
(decrease) of N, until the optimal steady state  ( ) { } [ ] δ ≤ = ∞ s ' g : s inf s
* , is attained.   
Proposition 4   17
In autarky, the optimal tax path is monotonic; it increases as s decreases towards the 
steady state, and vice versa.   
5.2. Production of the manufactured good 
As in the open access model of section 4, we find necessary condition (7):  () L ' M M = ω . 
Given the results we found for resource production in the first best model, when both goods are 
simultaneously produced, we conclude that 




* p L ' M M µ − = τ − = = ω      (29) 
5.3. Consumption 
As we found in the open-access model, the necessary conditions on the utility 




h = . Aggregated demands are similar to 
(11). 
5.4. Ricardian / Walrasian equilibrium 
Constraints (12) and (13) must still be obeyed in the economy, except that here, N 
depends on the same parameters as in the open access model, but also on the resource stock 
level, through the shadow price (µ), and therefore, through the optimal tax ( * τ ). 
5.5. Autarky: temporary and long-run equilibria 
Equation (14)-(16) must hold at all times, but now, again, N depends on the resource 
stock size through the per-unit tax charged to harvesters. The dynamics of the first best model is 
therefore richer than that of the open access model presented in section 4. 
We saw that the resource planner's optimal path towards the steady state is monotonic in 
s and that N changes over time. In a general equilibrium setting, a change in the N will trigger 
changes elsewhere in the economy. This leads to the following proposition. 
 
Proposition 5 
General equilibrium dynamic paths are monotonic in this autarkic economy. Furthermore, 
as s increases (decreases) towards its steady state, then the harvest increases (decreases), the 
production of manufactures decreases (increases), the wage rate increases (decreases), the   18
relative price of the resource good decreases (increases), and the instantaneous welfare of 
individuals increases (decreases).   
The first best autarkic dynamics is illustrated in Figure 5. 
(Insert Figure 5 about here) 
5.6. Free trade: temporary and long-run equilibria 
We assume that when trade opens, the resource stock is at its autarkic steady state and is 
positive (hence we assume that g'(0) > δ),  s s 0 A < < ∞ . The equilibrium autarky price just before 
trade opens is noted p
A. Since we assume that country A takes world prices as given, there are 
two cases of interest:  p p
A W > , and  p p





Production remains the same as in the autarkic steady state forever. If p
W > p
A, country A 
exports some resource good and imports some manufactured good. Welfare is always higher due 
to the new international exchange possibilities; hence the discounted welfare is higher than it 
would have been in autarky, and the steady state welfare is higher than it would have been in 
autarky as well. Finally, the natural resource is conserved.   
Case 1 of the first best model with trade is illustrated in Figure 6. 





Case 2 in the first best model can be subdivided into two sub cases, depending on the 
magnitude of the change in the relative terms of trade. 
 
Case 2a:  () [ ] h
~
L ' M A






A, but the difference between the two relative prices is not great, then the 
resource remains managed. Production and the resource stock remain at the same steady state as 
in autarky, but with different terms of trade and the opportunity to trade with the rest of the   19
world. Given the new, lower relative price, country A exports M and imports H, which is now 
relatively cheaper than in autarky. 
Welfare is always higher; hence the discounted welfare is higher than it would have been 
in autarky, and the steady state welfare is higher than it would have been in autarky as well. 
Finally, the natural resource is conserved.   
Case 2a of the first best model with trade is illustrated in Figure 7. 
(Insert Figure 7 about here) 
 
Case 2b: p
W < () [ ] h
~
L ' M A





A, and the decrease in relative price of the resource good is large enough so that 
the resource no longer has a positive inter-temporal shadow value, then the resource is no longer 
managed, country A produces more M than in autarky (or the exact same amount) and it exports 
some of it. It produces less, maybe none at all, H, and it imports it for at least part of its 
consumption. 
Welfare is always higher; hence the discounted welfare is higher than it would have been 
in autarky, and the steady state welfare is higher than it would have been in autarky as well. 
Finally, the natural resource is conserved.    
Case 2b of the first best model with trade is illustrated in Figure 8. 
(Insert Figure 8 about here) 
 
6. Second best world: fixed cost of resource management 
In reality, resource management is costly because it requires the use of inputs. For 
example, we know that tax collection and distribution is costly; in the US the cost is estimated to 
be about 40¢ per tax dollar. As a first approximation, we picture the fiscal apparatus as 
generating a fixed instantaneous cost of collection and redistribution, no matter what the tax rate 
might be, and assuming that taxpayers do not cheat.    20
6.1. Production of the resource good 
As we did for the first best model, we first solve the harvesting firms' problem. We then 
use the result into the social planner's problem. The only difference with section 5.1 is that the 
social planner must now pay a fixed cost at all times if he is to prevent open access. 
6.1.1. Harvesting firms 







h = = A
A




~ p.  
6.1.2. The resource planner 
Here the resource planner can charge a unit tax to the harvesters, but the collection and 
redistribution of the tax is costly in terms of a fixed amount of labor, L
T. In that case, the 
resource planner's autarkic problem is 
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~ h
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where x is a placeholder. 
The current value Hamiltonian corresponding to the resource planner's autarkic problem 
is: 
() () () A A
A ~ h
~








− µ + ω − ω − ∫ =      (31) 
where µ is the corresponding current value co-state variable. Using Leibnitz' rule of 
differentiation of integrals where appropriate and assuming an interior solution, the necessary 
conditions for this problem are the same as those for the first best model (equations (22)-(25)). 
Second order conditions therefore hold as well here, and we have a strictly concave problem. We 
therefore obtain the same result as before:  * * µ = τ . However here, µ* differs from what it was in 
the first best model because, the general equilibrium wage rate and price ratio are affected by the   21
cost of the planner's policy,  LT ω . Notice that the unique steady state of this second best 
management regime is at the same stock level than in the first best model,  () {} δ = = ∞ s ' g : s s
* , 
assuming that  () δ > 0 ' g . As before, we have extinction only if  ( ) δ ≤ 0 ' g . Propositions 3 and 4, 
which establish that all paths are on monotonic, hold in this second-best model.   
6.2. Production of the manufactured good and consumption 
Results here are the same as for the first best model: equation (29) must 
hold () ( ) ph p * h ω= −µ = −τ  . Furthermore, equilibrium price and aggregate demands are as in 




h = ,  ()
CC Hh p Y =  and  ( )
CC Mm p Y = . 
6.3. Ricardian / Walrasian equilibrium 
Budget constraint (13) must be obeyed in the economy: Y = pH
P + M
P. Equation (12) is 
however replaced by 
()L ' M ~ N
L L ~ N










A      (32) 
As in the first best model, N depends on the resource stock level through its shadow price 
(µ), and in turn, through the optimal tax ( * τ ). 
6.4. Autarky: temporary and long-run equilibria 
The dynamics of this second best model is also characterized by equations such as (26)-
(28) although magnitudes of optimal production and resulting income, for a given s(t), differ. 
Due to the use of labor for the tax collection and distribution, equation (16) is replaced by 
( ) ( ). L ~ N L M L M Y M T h
P
M
P C − − = = A        (33) 
With instantaneous fixed cost of resource management, Proposition 5, on the 
monotonicity of all paths in autarky, holds. Here however, the use of a portion of the labor force 
L
T, will result in a different wage rate than in the first best model, hence a different price ratio, a 
different consumption and resource extraction path, and a different tax as well, since µ, the 
shadow price of the resource, is affected by the need for L
T.   22
6.5. Free trade: temporary and long-run equilibria 
As before, we assume that when free trade occurs, the resource stock is at a positive 
steady state:  ( ) δ = ∞ s ' g A , which implies that g'(0) > δ. We assume that country A takes world 
prices as given. Welfare and resource conservation results are similar to those for the first best 
model. The reader is referred to Propositions 6, 7a and 7b directly. The interesting results with 
this second best resource management model are presented in the following section. 
 
7. "Hybrid" model with fixed cost of resource management:   open access as second best 
We now dive into the analysis of conditions for the optimal choice of regime and the 
possibility that open access turns out to be the second best resource management regime. Open 
access can be the first best regime when resource management is costless, as shown by Kemp 
and Van Long (1980) in continuous time and by Levhari et al. (1981) in discrete time. This is so 
because, in a well-behaved model, the shadow price of the resource varies inversely to the 
resource stock. Therefore, at high resource stocks, there could be no economic scarcity at all, and 
open access may be optimal. In the first best model however, as the resource stock decreases, the 
shadow price of the resource becomes positive, and therefore effective management is optimal at 
some point. 
The same inverse relationship between µ and s holds true in our first best model and our 
second best model with fixed cost of management (see equation (26)). Therefore, when resource 
management is costly, the shadow price of the resource decreases with the stock level. We know 
that the total value attributed to the present value resource exploitation decreases in the second 
best as compared to the first best; this is because of the extra cost considered in the problem. 
Intuitively, effective resource management could in fact be too costly to be worth engaging into, 
even though in a first best setting management would be optimal. Therefore, the critical stock at 
which the shadow price of the resource becomes zero is smaller in the second best model as 
compared to the first best model. In fact, if  LT ω  were high enough, it could even be that open 
access is better for all stock sizes. Then, management would never be chosen by the resource 
planner, simply because it is too costly for the economy. 
More formally, whether the resource planner hires L
T or leaves the resource to be 
exploited in open access is reflected by whether  0 > µ  or  0 = µ . From (22), we know that in the   23






− ⋅ = µ . Since the necessary conditions are similar for the second best 






− = µ . Assuming, as we did so far, that  0 1 > µ , is it 
possible that  0 2 = µ  in autarky? From the general equilibrium conditions, we know that 
1 2 ω > ω , but the difference between the prices is ambiguous. It is clear that if  1 2 p p ≤ , then 
1 2 µ < µ , and it still may be true for small enough differences in price in the other direction. 
Therefore, it is possible that  1 2 µ < µ , and the difference could be large enough so  0 2 = µ  in 
autarky for parameters such that  0 1 > µ . 
Given this possibility, we suppose that an open access positive steady state has occurred 
in autarky, such that  s s sMSY
A < ≤ ∞ , as a result of the second best model with too high a cost for 
effective management. 
7.1. Free trade: temporary and long-run equilibria 
The equilibrium autarky price just before trade opens is noted p
A. Again, let us look at 
the two cases:  p p
A W > , and  p p





Once country A is opened to trade, either of two things can happen: (i) due to particularly 
advantageous terms of trade, effective management can become optimal for the resource planner, 
either at the time of opening to free trade, or as the resource stock decreases, since an initial open 
access regime would lead to a decrease in resource stock; or (ii) the initial and following increase 
in wealth due to free trade is not sufficient, and open access is still the preferred regime, forever. 
The first case is a success story of free trade, where free trade not only generates more wealth but 
also triggers institutional changes for resource management. In contrast, the second case is the 
worst-case scenario where free trade allows greater exchange possibilities, but exacerbates the 
open access exploitation problem. Let us analyze both possibilities.   24
Proposition 8a 
In scenario (i) of Case 1, where free trade immediately triggers resource management, 
then discounted welfare is increased, and as long as  ( ) δ > 0 ' g , then the resource stock is 
conserved in the long run.    
See Figure 9 for an illustration of Case 1, scenario (i) where free trade immediately 
triggers resource management. 
(Insert Figure 9 about here) 
 
Proposition 8b 
In scenario (i) of Case 1, if free trade triggers resource management only after the 
resource stock has decreased under open access, then discounted welfare is increased as well, 
and as long as  () δ > 0 ' g , then the resource is also conserved in the long run.   
See Figure 10 for an illustration of Case 1, scenario (i), where free trade triggers resource 
management only after the resource stock has decreased under open access. 
(Insert Figure 10 about here) 
Even though p
W > p
A, open access can still be the preferred resource exploitation regime 
under free trade. This is because the cost of management,  LT ω , could still be prohibitively high 
and render resource management welfare-decreasing as compared to open access exploitation. 
Since µ decreases as the stock level increases (26), then open access could be optimal for large 
stocks only, or it could also happen at smaller stocks, possibly for all stock levels. The larger the 
labor management requirement, L
T, the higher total management cost. In any case, if  0 = µ  for 
some range of stock {s: s s 0 < ≤ }, then the steady state with trade in the case where p
W > p
A 
occurs at a stock level,s
T
∞, such that  s s 0 A T
∞ ∞ < ≤ . The new steady state could even be extinction. 
This is scenario (ii) of Case 1; see Figure 11 for an illustration. 
(Insert Figure 11 about here) 
Proposition 9 
Scenario (ii) of Case 1 is essentially the same as Case 1 in the open access model of 
section 4. Results are therefore similar to Proposition 1: second best management could lead both   25
to extinction and to a decrease in steady state welfare, and possibly even in discounted inter-
temporal welfare, as compared to autarky.   
This scenario is the least appealing for free trade; autarky could be better, both for 
welfare and conservation, even though with trade, open access is optimal from the resource 
planner's standpoint. Hence, trade can be welfare-decreasing, even with "proper" management, 
i.e., an economically sound national resource management policy. 
For illustrative purposes of Proposition 9, see Figure 11 (welfare is increased with free 
trade and the resource is conserved) and Figure 12 (the resource becomes extinct with free trade, 
and steady state welfare is decreased; discounted welfare could also decrease). 





Results here are as in the same case for the open access model: welfare is unambiguously 
improved and extinction is prevented (see Proposition 2 for details).   
7.2. Summary of results for the second-best model 
We now summarize our results about the impact of free trade on welfare and resource 
conservation, when resource management is costly (second best management). As before, we 
assume that  () δ > 0 ' g , so that under effective costly management, the resource is always 
conserved in the long run.   26





















+  Conservation  9 (and 1) 
+ Extinction  9 (and 1) 
(see Fig.12)  Open access
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+ Conservation  8a and 8b 






+ Conservation  6 
(See Fig. 5) 
 

























+ Conservation 7a 
Effective costly 
management 
Open access  +  Conservation  7b 
 
We see that the only case when free trade should perhaps not be chosen by country A is 
when the nation has a comparative advantage in the resource good, when open access prevails in 
autarky, and when it still prevails under free trade. In that case, free trade could be welfare 
decreasing, both in discounted terms and in steady state, and the resource could become extinct. 
Then, some positive level of trade barrier would be better than free trade, since autarky is better 
than free trade for country A. 
                                                 
6 We find, in an extension to this paper, that with stock dependence of static net gains, welfare change could be 
negative even without extinction. This occurs, for example, in Brander and Taylor (1997a).   27
We therefore conclude that since resource management is costly in reality, nations whose 
resources are exploited in open access should be careful about free trade since it could be welfare 
decreasing. Some level of trade barriers may be better then. 
 
8. Policy implications of our results 
In this paper, we were especially interested in comparing our results with some 
statements and questions recently found on the web site of the WTO, specifically: 
"Trade would unambiguously raise welfare if proper environmental policies were in 
place." (WTO, 2002d). 
This was disproved with one example (Proposition 8 and Figure 9), due to costly resource 
management, which in reality makes the "proper" management of the resource less than perfect. 
In a second best world, where renewable resource management is not free, trade does not 
unambiguously raise welfare when "proper" environmental policies are in place. If the WTO 
means first best policies by "proper" policies, then we must agree with the statement. However, 
given that the world is second best as we defined it, i.e., resource management is costly, then the 
WTO statement does not always hold true empirically. 
"Does freer trade help or hinder environmental protection?" (WTO, 2002a). 
This question is investigated by looking at whether or not free trade can cause the 
extinction of a renewable resource. The answer is yes, free trade can cause the extinction of a 
species (see Proposition 8 and Figure 9). Therefore, we conclude that freer trade can hinder the 
environment. However, it could also help it, if it promotes better resource management. 
Therefore, there is ambiguity in the answer to this question. 
"Members say the removal of trade restrictions and distortions can yield benefits both for 
the multicultural trading system and the environment." (WTO, 2002a). 
While this may be true for agricultural export subsidies for example, it is not so clear for 
environmental policies in general. Typical policy interventions in renewable resource 
management are quotas and taxes, which in an international setting seem like trade restrictions. 
The WTO tends to promote environmental policies other than quotas and tariffs, but they may be 
some countries' best shot at managing their resources soundly. 
In fact, policies that serve as trade barriers for good H can even be Pareto-optimal. Such 
policies can be welfare increasing for an H-exporting country (country A) with prohibitively   28
costly resource management. And they can also be beneficial for an H-importing country 
(importing form country A) that has in situ resource stock value, and therefore, who may agree to 
bear the cost of the policy. Therefore, trade barriers for good H can be Pareto-efficient, as 
opposed to trade barriers on "normal" (not resource-based) goods. 
Given our results, an important question is: "In which cases must we be careful about free 
trade in the presence of a resource-based production sector?" In our model, if resource 
management is ineffective in autarky, then the relative price increase due to trade needs to be 
high enough to trigger the improvement of management. Otherwise, the losses due to greater 
harvest with ineffective resource management could overcome the gains from trade. Knowing 
that, what can be done? Trade barriers for good H are a possible type of policy, which in time 
could perhaps be decreased if some level of trade-based growth promotes the improvement of 
resource management. Our model does not address this possibility directly however, and it seems 
like an interesting subject of future research. 
Aid in the form of technology transfer and expertise could also be considered, but their 
positive effect on resource management would be long term. Such international cooperation 
already exists under the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna 
and Flora (CITES). CITES, an international environmental voluntary agreement, was introduced 
in 1973, to keep track of renewable resources being traded worldwide, to protect them from 
illegal trade and possibly from extinction. CITES policies generally are trade quotas and trade 
bans. We note however that our model serves to show that free trade can be welfare-decreasing 
for nations that have ineffectively managed resources in general, not endangered resources only. 
Unfortunately, current policy under CITES only covers the resources that are in danger of 
extinction, and WTO policy prevents trade barriers unless a species is covered under CITES. 
Hence, there seems to be a gap in current policy relating to renewable resources that are traded. 
 
Conclusion 
In this paper, we presented a Ricardian trade model with endogenous resource 
management. In a model where resource management incurs a fixed cost (a form of transaction 
cost), we have provided some answers to statements and questions asked by the WTO. Because 
of the transaction cost in resource management, it is possible that the best one can do nothing: 
the resource is exploited in open access. "Proper" resource management, i.e., economically sound   29
national management, does not always result in effective management. This is because, as the 
resource stock decreases, economic scarcity does not necessarily follow from physical scarcity; 
the shadow price of the renewable resource can remain equal to zero. This is plausible with 
transactions costs, although without them, physical scarcity necessarily leads, at some point, to 
economic scarcity.  
If such a case is realized in autarky, then free trade can be detrimental to the welfare of 
the home country as well as the environment. We expect these cases to arise in less economically 
developed nations where resource management is often ineffective.   30
APPENDIX I: PROOFS OF PROPOSITIONS 
 
Proposition 1 – specialization vs. diversification 
Because the manufactures sector production function is concave, we may have a positive 
level of  A
~ N L L h M − =  such that  ( ) L ' M h
~
p M
W = , in which case there would be diversification 
with trade. However, if  () 0 ' M h
~
p
W ≥ , then country A specializes in the resource good.   
Proposition 2 – specialization vs. diversification 
Since with diversified production,  h
~
p
W = ω , then specialization occurs only if 
() h
~
p L ' M
W ≥ . However, if  () h
~
p L ' M
W < , then labor is hired in the manufactures sector up to a 
level such that  () h
~
p L L ' M
W
M = <  is satisfied, and country A's harvest is 
() ( ) L L H L H M
P
H
P − = .  
Proposition 3 
The optimal steady state stock,  ( ) { } [ ] δ ≤ = ∞ s ' g : s inf s
* , was deducted from (23). 
Necessary conditions lead to (28), whose first right-hand-side factor is positive for a scarce 
resource, and whose second right-hand-side factor has the sign opposite to that of  () s ' g − δ . Since 
g''(s) < 0, it must be that N increases (decreases) as s increases (decreases). Since H




total harvest increases (decreases) with N and s.   
Proposition 4 
Since,  µ = τ* , from (27) and Proposition 3, then Proposition 4 must hold.   
Proposition 5 
 Production: 



























h  , and N varies in the 




P = . Therefore 
A   ~ h
~
N H h
P = . Hence, H
P varies in the same direction as N and s. For the manufactured good, at 
any given time,  () ( ) ( ) A
~





P − = − = . Therefore,  ()A   ~ ' M N M h
P P ⋅ − = . 
Therefore H
P varies in the opposite direction of N and s. 
 Equilibrium  prices:   31



















= = = , where  ( )
CC Hh p Y =  and  ( )





P. This will hold in time, and so we can replace H
C   by H
P   and 
M
C   by M
P   for the evolution of harvest and manufactures over time in the Ricardian 
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 . Given that H changes in the same direction as s, 
and M changes in the opposite direction, and since for a homothetic utility function 
[] 0 u u u u MH H HH M < −  and [] u u u u MM H MH M − >0, we conclude that changes in p are opposite to 
changes in s. 
From the manufactures production sector, we found that  ( ) L ' M M = ω . Since 
A
~
N L L h M − = , we find that  ()A   ~ ' ' M N h
P ⋅ − = ω . Therefore, the wage rate, ω, varies in the same 
direction as N and s. 
 Instantaneous  welfare: 
Welfare changes are measured by changes in the indirect utility function v(p,Y). 
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 in autarky (see APPENDIX II). 
Given our assumption of homotheticity of the utility function, then  ( )( ) M H p p v    + ν = , which 
given our findings above leads to  ( ) ( ) ' M h
~





p > µ = ω −  (22), welfare changes can be rewritten as  ( ) h
~ ~ N p v hµ ν = A   . Therefore welfare 




A. Hence, the price ratio has changed with trade, and country A now 
exports some of the resource good produced and imports some manufactures. Also, since for the 
same production, the relative revenue is higher in the economy, then utility is higher. This model 
being the first best, there is no dynamic externality in the economy. That means that the 
discounted utility after trade opens is greater than it would have been in autarky. Additionally, 
since the steady state remains the same, it means that instantaneous utility is higher forever. 




H = , and since preferences are homothetic, this 
means that the price change leads to a decrease in the consumption of H and an increase in the 
consumption of M. However, the same quantity as before is produced since the economy is 
already at the optimal steady state. Therefore, H is exported and M is imported. 
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since the production pattern does not change. By Roy's identity, we know that this is equal to 
() [] 0 dp H H
Y
Y , p v
dv
P C > + −
∂
∂
= , from the pattern of trade and change in relative price. 
Therefore, welfare necessarily increases with trade in this case. 
Since we assumed that g'(0) > δ, and since, when static net gains do not depend on the 
resource stock, the optimal steady state is not affected by the resource stock either, then steady 
state with trade is the same as in autarky: g'(s
*
∞) = δ. There is no possibility of extinction as long 




A, and the decrease in relative price of H in free trade is large enough that 
the resource no longer has an inter-temporal shadow value. Since the aggregate production of 
manufactures is concave, with trade and  p p
A W < , country A will produce more manufactures 
than in autarky (or the same amount in the special case where  ( ) h
~
L ' M p A
, M
W
∞ = ), but it may not   33
specialize in it. Under diversified production, we have  ( )
W
M M' h p L ω= =  . Therefore 
specialization occurs only if  ()
W
M M' L L h p =≥ . However, if  ( )
W
M M' L L h p =< , then labor is 
hired in the manufactures sector up to the point where  ( ) h
~
p L L ' M
W
M = <  is satisfied, and 
country A's harvest is  () ( ) L L H L H M
P
H




H = , and since 
preferences are homothetic, this means that the price change leads to an increase in the 
consumption of H and a decrease in the consumption of M. However, due to the market relative 
price change, more M and less H are produced (or the same amount if  () h
~
L ' M p A
, M
W
∞ = ). 
Therefore, H is imported and M is exported. 
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From the pattern of trade and change in relative price, the first term is positive or zero if 
the same amounts of H and M are produced as in autarky. Also, production and import-export 
react to the new relative price so that the relative revenue of the economy, Y = pH
P + M
P, 
increases. Therefore, dY = dpH
P + pdH
P + dM
P > 0. Since, from autarky to trade, dp < 0, it must 
be that pdH
P + dM
P > 0. Hence, the second term is also positive. We conclude that welfare 
unambiguously increases with trade in this case. 
In either the diversified case or the specialized case, the long run equilibrium stock with 
free trade, s
T
∞ , is such that  () ( ) s g L L H M
P




∞ . Therefore when p
W < p
A, extinction 
cannot occur due to trade.   
Proposition 9 
Refer to the proof of Proposition 1.   
Proposition 10 
Refer to the proof of Proposition 2.     34
APPENDIX II: NOTES ON WELFARE COMPARISONS 
 
A.II.1 Welfare comparisons using the indirect utility function in autarky 
With homothetic utility functions, the expenditure function is written as E(p,µ) = e(p)µ, 
where µ is the utility level attained and e(p) ≡ E(p,1) is the unit (utility) expenditure function. We 
note that e(p) can be interpreted as a price index or a "cost of living" index. By duality, the 
corresponding indirect utility function then takes the form: 
()() () Y p
p e
Y
Y , p v v ν = = = .      (A.1) 
Changes in welfare can be measured by changes in indirect utility as follows: 
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= .     (A.2) 
We know that the economy's income is 
P P M pH Y + = . Therefore, it must be that 
P P P dM pdH dp H dY + + = .      (A.3) 
This gives us a way of measuring welfare changes. Using (A.3), we obtain 
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   (A.4) 
By Roy's identity, the first term of the factor in brackets -HC. The factor in brackets is 
therefore the excess demand for H. In autarky, demand equals supply within the economy, and 
therefore 
( )( ). dM pdH
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=       (A.5) 
 
A.II.2 Welfare comparisons using the indirect utility function in free trade 
Since we assume no possibility of saving and borrowing, then we still have 
P P M pH Y + = . Using 
P P P dM pdH dp H dY + + = , we obtain (A.4):   35
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but this time,  ()
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 since there can be trade.   36
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Figure 1. Assumptions on individual firms' harvest production function 
 
 
            () Ah h  
 
 
          ( ) Ah h  
 
 








   0   A
min
h        A
~












          A
~ h
~
N h  
 
 






          0        smin         sMSY      s
A
∞      s           s 
   39
 





    M        production with free trade (worst case scenario) 
      production and consumption in autarky 
 
       autarky budget line (slope = - p
A) 





       U
T
∞ 
    consumption with free trade 
 
        free trade budget line (slope = - p
W)                PPF 
 
           H  
Here, we see that  U U
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Figure 5: Autarkic phase diagram with 1
st best management 
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Figure 7. 1
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8.
                                                 
7 Production remains the same in free trade as in autarky.  However, with the new terms of trade, M is 
exported and H is imported.   42
Figure 9: One possible 2
nd best outcome; free trade success story 
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Figure 10: One possible 2
nd best outcome; free trade success story 
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8 With free trade, more M and less H are produced than in autarky.  M is exported and H is imported.   43
Figure 11: One possible 2
nd best outcome under free trade 
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Figure 12: One possible 2
nd best outcome; worst case scenario under free trade 
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